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Review Essay of technology has been distinguishing, to some extent as a supplement to Heidegger, devices from things. Devices disburden and disperse their users whereas things enable and focus their users. Although it is at times ambiguous in Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life , 4 it seems that this distinction is not strictly one that can be applied to products themselves, as designed, but rather concerns products as used. Generally the more infrastructural or black-boxed a technology, the more likely it is to be something that we use without heeding; as opposed to things that demand that we, and others around us if the thing is used in their presence, engage with how it works, or rather, is worked.
However, as hackers of all sorts evidence, things designed to function in the background or hidden behind interfaces invariably can and do get opened up and reworked in ways that indicate how devices can be re-focused on in thingly ways. This means that the distinction is more about the tendencies associated with how products get used, in other words, the worlds and ways of being-in-those-worlds that those products design. Things design engagement with what and how they are, including all that, and who, is supporting, and benefi ting from, them; whereas devices design disengagement from the how and who of all we depend on. In terms of Borgmann ' s critique, the evaluation to be made concerns the extent to which the design of a product, as evidenced by its wider context of use, designs focusing or defocusing life-worlds.
Because what is at issue is the nature of this second ' designs ' , that is to say, the extent to which the nature of an artefact determines its take-up and the wider and longer term consequences of that take-up, Borgmann is for me, not just a philosopher who uses the word design, but a philosopher of design, of just what the concept of design does, but also can and should, mean.
It was therefore exciting to see that one of the major contributions to the discourse of ethics that Borgmann claims for his new book Real American Ethics: Taking Responsibility for our Country 5 is the introduction of the notion of design:
We have a term for the political virtue of caring for equality -it is justice; and there is a something of a term for the virtue of caring for the environment -it is stewardship. But what is the term for political rather than private economy … we have to conscript a term that is helpful but not perfect, and design has the right connotations. (10) The work that Borgmann wants ' design ' to do is precisely the wider sense of the life-worlds designs design. Throughout the book, Borgmann calls this sense of design the " Churchill principle " , referring to Winston Churchill ' s speech promising to rebuild the Houses of Parliament in London after their WWII bombing: " We shape our buildings and afterwards our buildings shape us. "
The most glaring blank on the moral canvas however, is the unconcern with Churchill ' s principle. If we are unaware of how the shaping of our household typically shapes our practices, we can tell our children to do their homework, to stay away from soda pop and snacks, to talk to us, and to practice their instruments till we are blue in the face -it will only create frustration and resentment unless our home is so arranged that doing the right thing comes naturally or at least does not require heroic self-discipline. (10) Here Borgmann is not only pointing out the absence of design in the discourse of ethics, but pointing to a major failing of ethics, its principled mentalism that always stumbles on implementation due to the material constraints of the world. This is what Borgmann means by the ' real ' in the title of his book. He is looking for an ethics that is real about how it might be realised:
But there is this assumption in theoretical and practical ethics that life unfolds on an empty stage, or at least the belief that, when it comes to doing the right thing, the props on the stage of life don ' t matter much.
That was a reasonable assumption when the material culture changed slowly and its moral signifi cance came to no more than being fair in distributing things and moderate in enjoying thing … But the Industrial Revolution changed the stage of life from the ground up, and now the technological devices that surround us channel the typical ways we behave. (11) Unless ethics takes account of the designed and designing nature of the world, it will keep fi nding itself subject to what Stewart and Kasunic have identifi ed as modern akrasia . 6 Following their argument, without an adequate understanding of designed material culture from the perspective of philosophical ethics, ' real ethics ' will remain the remit of, not philosophers, but the implicit project of designers, facilitating this action, inhibiting that, without suffi cient self-critical awareness of their role as (devolved) moral agents. This is Borgmann ' s worry (inherited from Dewey): that technology, in providing a prevalent instance of (or substitute for) ' the good life ' , " shapes our society and propels it on its way " , but in a way " that is as defi nite as it is invisible " (17). Unrecognised as a morality, technology becomes ' the silent majority. ' For Borgmann, taking the measure of his homeland in contemporary United States, 7 this leads to a fragile decency: 8
American decency is distracted and indifferent. It has no vision and no voice. It is largely uninformed and unconcerned. There is no real conception of the good life that decent people Design Philosophy Papers Review Essay are willing to assert and support in political campaigns and elections. (16) Nor is there a conception of the good life that decent people can even martial when talking to their designers.
Robert Kirkman has an exceptionally clear conception of design as a moral virtue: ' A particular way of building is good to the extent that it makes it easier for people to live well, to be good people, and to participate in community life; it is bad to the extent that it makes these things more diffi cult by harming individual well-being, fostering injustice, fragmenting communities, or undermining the conditions of its own continuation. ' But he has also found that people are either outright hostile to the very idea or they use ' comfortably vague terms ' such as ' green space ' , ' progress ' , ' family ' and above all ' quality of life ' to avoid an incisive conversation about design. When decisions have to be made, the narrowing of moral discourse we have observed before takes place, and a ' proxy battle ' ensues. ' A proxy battle, ' Kirkman explains, ' is a confl ict over a concrete problem or decision that stands in the place of much broader debate over basic values. ' (134-5) Without the ability to articulate, at an individual or collective level, designs as ethical values realised -morality made durable as Latour would say 9 -the decency that it is currently being obtained by the design of middle America for example, is at risk of displacement by extremists who are succeeding in articulating visions.
Borgmann ' s book is therefore a welcome rereading of a range of traditional approaches to ethics -Kantian duty, utilitarianism, evolutionary psychology (Dennett), Rawls ' theory of justice, and virtue ethics -in a contemporary designed context. These accounts are clear, often with elegantly simple terminology that should enable designers at least to be more articulate about the traditions with which they are practicing. However, I did not feel that the book was as successful in introducing philosophers, nor perhaps any non-designers, to the ethical signifi cance of design. And this is mostly because, despite having made such signifi cant contributions to the philosophy of design, Borgmann, or those inspired by his work, still have much to clarify about design.
Too often in this book Borgmann has recourse to the Churchill principle without any substantial elaboration of the nature of the ' shaping ' it invokes. To architects still running scared from modernism, the phrase calls up all the determinism of positivistically behavioural ' environment design research. ' To the tenured radicals of cultural studies, materialist shaping is in principle impotent, forever open to the detournement of local tacticians, the real issue being power/knowledge. 10 Jelsma via Latour and Akrich has started to use the language of more or less open or closed scripts to explain the force of things. 11 Elsewhere, Borgmann has made some forays into these disputes about what ' shaping entails ' . In response to Verbeek ' s critical review of his philosophy of technology as overly deterministic, Borgmann comments:
The problem lies in the slide [in a quote from Verbeek] from " is more engaging" to " can involve themselves intensely." Yes, people can so involve themselves; it's important to point that out. But do they? What's the aggregate effect of all the devices at people's disposal? This is an empirical rather than transcendental question. And if the answer is depressing, as it surely is in the United States at least, why is it so? Is it not possible that to capture this gross effect of technology we need to resort to something like Heidegger's comprehensive characterization of technology? 12 I think that this way of thinking about the Churchill design principle, as something like ' can tends to lead to will ' , is really important. It needs to be progressed through a de-biologising and re-socialising of Gibson ' s notion of affordance, 13 where things are interactionally and collaboratively perceived as not only promoting themselves for certain uses, but therein promoting certain uses. It is interesting that when Latour butts up against this he often calls up Francois Julien ' s sinology, particularly his account of The Propensity of Things . 14 These are the sorts of approaches I was hoping Borgmann was going to pursue in Real American Ethics but does not. He is instead content to remain at the level of what he calls in the quote from the Verbeek review, the ' empirical ' , observing where and when things correlate with, rather than cause, device-like relations to the world. Borgmann has in fact always insisted on conducting his philosophy on this level, the level of ' character ' or ' paradigm ' rather than ' category ' or ' essence ' . 15 However, after working through this book ' s various observations, I started to worry about a possible contradiction in Borgmann ' s design ethics. Real American Ethics often in the last chapters returns to the ideas of Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life around the commodifi cation of technology. For Borgmann, technologies are commodities less in the Marxist sense of being divorced from the human conditions of their production, than in the etymological sense of becoming " commodious, that is, convenient and comfortable " (156), in other words, being divorced from the human conditions of their consumption, the physical and intellectual and social labour of using things in ways that brings out the best in us.
There is a danger that the response that seems most appropriate to this ' moral commodifi cation ' is the ' hard life ' of America ' s puritanical heritage, that one should respond to the dangers of disburdenment not with focusing but with reburdenment.
Borgmann is not just being realistic in not calling for this, but is in fact, as all the mentions of the Churchill principle throughout the book indicate, committed in principle to a ' real ethics ' , that is, an ethics that realises itself though design, that makes being good less hard to do: " The task is to turn [the Churchill] principle in favour of the good life and the good society. Unless we get to be schooled and practiced in realizing Churchill ' s principle on behalf of moral excellence, this won ' t happen " (162).
The task must therefore be something like: not making (things that make) ' being good ' automatic or easy, which would be moral commodifi cation; nor in demanding that being good entails standing unassisted against the device paradigm; 16 but rather designing the things, and the use and engagement with things, that make it less diffi cult to take up what is less easy. There may be no contradiction between making things that guide people to use them in particular ways, and guiding people, through philosophy, and education more generally, to use things in ways other than how they have been made; and there may be no contradiction between making less diffi cult and not making too easy. 17 If that is the case, then Borgmann ' s Real American Ethics is an important facilitation of the diffi cult question of design ethics. in Design Philosophy Papers have been trying to get at in response to Latour and Thackara; that we need things that prompt discussions about the extent to which we would like things to do without what we need to discuss.
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